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GADAMERIAN REFLECTIONS ON FLORENSKY’S AESTHETICS
1. Introduction
The hermeneutical approach I adopt in this paper is neither historical‑
‑philosophical, nor purely systematic. On the one hand, I do not dare to broach 
a historic ‑philosophical account of Florensky’s aesthetics, something which 
would exceed both the bounds of this essay and the range of my competences; 
nor, on the other hand, do I even intend to offer any theoretical considerations 
concerning Florensky’s aesthetic writings, his theory of space, of perspective 
or of cult, from a systematic point of view. The paper does not aim to try to 
classify Florensky’s approach under any label – whether aesthetic formalism, 
aesthetic realism or aesthetic symbolism.
Rather, here I dare to attempt a parallel reading of certain texts by Pa‑
vel Florensky and Hans ‑Georg Gadamer. Again, this approach should not 
be considered historical ‑philosophical – which is to say: I do not seek to 
establish, as Leon Chernyak did in an essay published more than thirty years 
ago1, a  problematic historical ‑philosophical connection between Florensky 
 1  “The Heidegger ‑Gadamer hermeneutic starts (both in a positive and in a negative 
sense) from Husserl’s teaching. We cannot say the same about the philosophy of 
Pavel Florensky. How would Florensky’s views have evolved had he experienced 
the influence of Husserl’s ideas? Fortunately, history has done this extrapolation 
for us. Let us consider A. F. Losev. One of the most prominent Russian Platonists, 
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and Gadamer. I do not even intend (at least, not as a main objective) mere‑
ly to establish some parallels or affinities on some particular points in the 
aesthetics of the two authors. In fact, as will soon become clear, I deal with 
texts which tackle very different topics (in one case reverse perspective, in 
the other the notion of aesthetic consciousness). I will rather analyze some 
notions and considerations by both thinkers in order to allow the emergence 
of some common views, or at least of common orientations, in relation to some 
overarching aesthetic topics. I don’t claim that Florensky anticipated Gadamer, 
or conversely that Gadamer was repeating statements already formulated by 
Florensky. But I do believe that by reading both authors together, and two 
of their texts in particular, one can reach a better understanding of what is 
implied in both texts, particularly in relation to two main general topics: on 
the one side, what can preliminarily be labelled a critique of modern aesthetics 
(this topic will occupy sections three and four); on the other, an idea of the 
aesthetic experience as taking place in what I will call a performative space 
(this topic will be treated in a preliminary fashion in section two and more 
in detail in the fifth and final section).
2. Florensky’s Essay The Church Ritual as a Synthesis of the Arts: 
Between Synesthesia and Performative Space
I start my investigation with a short text by Pavel Florensky, The Church 
Ritual as a Synthesis of the Arts, which, Nicoletta Misler notes, was written “in 
October 1918 for a lecture he was invited to give to the Commission for the 
Losev, by his own admission, formulated his ideas directly from those of Florensky. 
At the same time, Losev is one of the most significant Russian Husserlians. So, we 
have good grounds to compare the Russian and German lines of the philosophical 
comprehension of language” (Chernyak, 1988, 203–204). In fact, I don’t share 
Chernyak’s hermeneutical justification (as I don’t concur with other arguments 
employed in his essay, as will become clear). On the one side, the fact that Losev is 
both Husserlian and influenced by Florensky’s aesthetics does not constitute per se 
a ground to think that a comparison between the two authors would be pertinent. 
On the other, two authors can arrive totally independently at common conclusions 
about a particular topic. Given the absence of an established historical connection, 
in terms of the reception of texts I prefer to directly take hermeneutical responsibility 
concerning the common views I claim to identify in the two authors: this seems to 
me to be a more transparent approach.
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Preservation of Monuments and Antiquities of the Lavra. This Commission was 
organized immediately after the October Revolution by the new government 
in an effort to counteract the vandalism and pillaging that threatened the 
property and treasures of the Lavra, the vital center of Russian Orthodoxy.”2
In this essay, after a first introductory paragraph, Florensky takes a quite 
radical position against museums, as, so to speak, institutionalized collections 
of artworks:
In the ensuing discussion it will perhaps become apparent that a museum – to 
bring my idea to its conclusion – a museum that functions autonomously is false 
and essentially pernicious to art, because although the work of art is classified 
as an object, in no sense is it merely an object. It is not an ἔργον, an immobile, 
stagnant, dead mummy of artistic production. It should be understood as an 
unquenchable, eternally beating flow of creativity itself, as the creator’s living, 
pulsating activity. Even though it is removed from the artist in time and space, 
it remains inseparable from him. It still radiates and plays with the colours of 
life, it still flows with the ενέργεια of the spirit.3 
The following lines of the essay seem to suggest that Florensky here 
pledges allegiance to a sort of historicist view of art: works of art, as living 
beings, have to be placed in their own environment. The crime of museum is 
so to say to deracinate them from their own habitat and put them artificially 
together in a collection. A true, genuine museum should, on this basis, recon‑
struct such an environment in order to allow a more appropriate aesthetic 
experience.
This reasonable criticism of museums as deracinated collections of artworks 
is, however, to be set alongside the considerations offered at the end of this 
short essay, where explicit reference is made to Scriabin’s Prefatory Act:
I could understand a fanatical demand to destroy the Lavra and leave not 
a stone standing, made in the name of the religion of socialism. But I abso‑
lutely refuse to understand a Kulturtrüger who, on the basis of nothing more 
than a fortuitous overabundance of specialists in the visual arts in our day, 
fervently protects the icons, the frescoes and the walls themselves, and remains 
indifferent to other, no less valuable achievements of ancient art. But most 
importantly he doesn’t take into account the highest goal of the arts, their 
 2 Misler in Florensky 2002, 97. See also Misler’s considerations included in the general 
introduction to Florensky’s aesthetic writings (Misler 2002, 42–46).
 3 Florensky 2002, 101–102.
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ultimate synthesis, so successfully and distinctively resolved in the church 
ritual of the Troitse ‑Sergieva Lavra, and sought with such insatiable thirst by 
the late Skriabin. It is not to the arts but to Art that our age aspires, to the 
very core of Art as a primordial unifying activity. And for Art it is no secret, 
where not only the text, but the entire artistic embodiment of the Prefatory 
Action is concealed.4
It is well known that in other texts Florensky explicitly formulated neg‑
ative judgments about Scriabin’s music, and that the reference to him in this 
context was possibly dictated by non ‑musical and non ‑theoretical reasons.5 
But this is not relevant; the point, rather, is to ask what makes this reference 
to the last unfinished work of Scriabin plausible in this context. The answer can 
be found in Scriabin’s words about how he imagined a performance of Myste­
rium (for which the Prefatory Act would have constituted a preliminary act):
In this artistic event there will not be a single spectator. All will be partici‑
pants. The work requires special people, special artists and a completely new 
culture. […] The cast of performers includes, of course, an orchestra, a large 
mixed choir, an instrument with visual effects, dancers, a procession, incense, 
rhythmicized textual articulation.6
Here there are two points to be noted: one, the evident importance of 
the notion of synesthesia, which is implicitly endorsed by Florensky in his 
idea of church ritual as synthesis of arts, as valorizing not only the visual and 
acoustical elements, but all the sensual inputs related to it.7 
As aesthetically relevant this aspect might be, however, it is not what I am 
interested in as regards the argument I intend to develop. In Scriabin’s excerpt 
there is a second, less evident aspect, which not only makes his (more or less 
politically induced) reference plausible, but also relevant for Florensky’s general 
aesthetic approach. It is the idea of what we can call a performative space, i.e. 
a space which is characterized (to put it briefly) by the fact of participating in 
something. The spectators in a performative space are witnessing something by 
taking part in it.8 In this respect, a historicist attitude towards art, according 
 4 Florensky 2002, 111.
 5 See in this respect Misler 2002, 41–42.
 6 Morrison 2019, 151.
 7 Florensky 2002, 108.
 8 See on this notion Fischer ‑Lichte 2008, 107–114. More on this in the last section of 
the essay. See also Gadamer’s considerations about the notion of Theoros in Note 55.
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to which we should enjoy a work of art by placing it within its environment, 
i.e. its historical context (a classical example of such an attitude consists in 
the historically informed musical performance), would not be the right alter‑
native to the modern museum, in Florensky’s eyes. The recipient envisaged 
by Scriabin, which takes part in the cult, shares nothing in common with the 
modern art connoisseur, who reads all the historical information in the program 
note or elsewhere before going to listen to a concert. The recipient envisaged 
by Scriabin (and Florensky) does not aim at the appropriate consumption of an 
artistic cultural good: he intends rather to participate in an event. The real sin 
of the museum, accordingly, is not only that it would deracinate the works of 
art from their environments and put them together in a collection, but also 
(and possibly more importantly) that it deracinates the recipient, by fostering 
a detached position in front of a work of art as a disinterested, unengaged spec­
tator. What Florensky implicitly envisages by the reference to Scriabin is in 
fact a criticism of a Kantian ­inspired aesthetic approach which is, in Florensky’s 
view (and in Hegel’s terms), alienated.9
This interpretation of Florensky’s approach is supported by the fact that 
a criticism of the notion of an unengaged subject, observing from an external 
point of view a piece ‑of‑the ‑world placed in front of it – a sort of pictorial 
representative of Kant’s transcendental subject – is at the very center of one of 
Florensky’s most influential aesthetic writings, namely the essay “Reverse 
Perspective.” There he explicitly takes a stance not only against Kant, but 
against an entire Weltanschauung that, in his view, was so to speak implicitly 
aesthetically exemplified in the Renaissance by the invention of perspective, 
before being explicitly theoretically formulated in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. 
I tackle this text in the fourth section of this essay. First, however, I introduce 
the second voice in this dialogical composition, namely Hans ‑Georg Gadamer. 
In his main work Truth and Method a criticism of the notion of the museum is 
also to be found, namely in the chapter consecrated to the notion of aesthetic 
consciousness. This, in my view, furnishes hermeneutical tools that are valu‑
able for understanding Florensky’s criticism of modernity formulated in his 
above ‑mentioned major essay.
 9 More on this point in the fourth section of the essay.
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3. Gadamer’s Criticism of Aesthetic Consciousness 
as Criticism of Modernity
It is obviously no coincidence that aesthetic consciousness, which develops the 
concept of art and the artistic as a way of understanding traditional structures 
and so performs aesthetic differentiation, is simultaneous with the creation of 
museum collections that gather together everything we look at in this way. 
Thus we make every work of art, as it were, into a picture. By detaching all art 
from its connections with life and the particular conditions of our approach to 
it, we frame it like a picture and hang it.10
This passage from Truth and Method, whether we like it or not, almost 
literally repeats Florensky’s criticism of the institution of modern museums as 
deracinating both artworks and recipients. Here, however, we have not only 
a crime – embodied in the museum as a collection of artworks severed from 
“their connections” – but also a murder. The perpetrator of this crime are not 
the political powers which have instituted museums in different countries, 
but rather a particular attitude to works of art, rooted in Kant’s and Schiller’s 
aesthetics, which encouraged and, in Gadamer’s eyes, demanded such institu‑
tion, which he calls aesthetic consciousness:
The idea of aesthetic cultivation – as we derived it from Schiller – consists 
precisely in precluding any criterion of content and in dissociating the work 
of art from its world. One expression of this dissociation is that the domain 
to which the aesthetically cultivated consciousness lays claim is expanded to 
become universal. […] Through reflection, aesthetic consciousness has passed 
beyond any determining and determinate taste, and itself represents a total lack 
of determinacy. It no longer admits that the work of art and its world belong 
to each other, but on the contrary, aesthetic consciousness is the experiencing 
(erlebende) center from which everything considered art is measured. […] 
By disregarding everything in which a work is rooted (its original context of 
life, and the religious or secular function that gave it significance), it becomes 
visible as the “pure work of art.”11
As in the case of Florensky, it seems that the obvious consequence of 
such premises would be praise of historicism: if the sin of the aesthetic con‑
10 Gadamer 2004, 130–131.
11 Gadamer 2004, 73–74.
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sciousness it is to consider a work of art as a pure aesthetic object, then the 
correct attitude should be on the contrary to see it as a historical object, whose 
chara cteristics are to be understood in relation to its social, cultural, economic, 
and mainly historical context. Only through this additional information we 
can read and interpret the work of art appropriately.
Hermeneutical aesthetics, including Gadamer’s, is indeed sometimes re‑
duced to such an attitude – according to which (to put it provocatively) we 
have to read the Bach ­Lexikon before listening to the St Matthew Passion: and 
once we have done that, having accomplished our hermeneutical duties, we 
can buy the ticket for the concert and be accepted into the paradise of the art 
connoisseurs. Such a view, at least in Gadamer’s case, is totally misleading. 
In fact, according to Gadamer, the historicist attitude is only a sophisticated 
version of the aesthetic attitude. In order to understand such an apparently 
paradoxical statement we have again to read Gadamer:
Since aesthetic consciousness claims to embrace everything of artistic value, it 
has the character of simultaneity. As aesthetic, its form of reflection in which 
it moves is therefore not only present. For inasmuch as aesthetic consciousness 
makes everything it values simultaneous, it constitutes itself as historical at 
the same time. It is not just that it includes historical knowledge and uses it as 
a distinguishing mark: rather dissolution of all taste determined by content, as 
proper to aesthetic taste, is also seen explicitly in the creative work of artists 
who turn to the historical. […] De facto contemporaneity (Gleichzeitigkeit) 
becomes simultaneity (Simultaneität) in principle only when one is fundamen‑
tally prepared to resist denigrating any taste that differs from one’s own “good” 
taste. In place of the unity of a taste we now have a mobile sense of quality. The 
“aesthetic differentiation” performed by aesthetic consciousness also creates 
an external existence for itself. It proves its productivity by reserving special 
sites for simultaneity: the “universal library” in the sphere of literature, the 
museum, the theater, the concert hall, etc.12
In Gadamer’s view, and according to the approach of aesthetic (and histo‑
rical) consciousness, we might not only look, on Monday, through the program 
notes before going to listen to the St Matthew Passion, but, on Tuesday, we 
might also inform ourselves about the use of psychedelic drugs in the seventies 
in order to appreciate, that evening, a concert of progressive pop; and after 
that we can listen to some Paganini and Kreutzer in order to appreciate the 
12 Gadamer 2004, 74–75.
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quotations in the solos of a Heavy Metal concert given on Wednesday; while 
on Thursday, we can cast a glance at the political movements of the sixties 
in Europe and North America in order to appreciate the significance of the 
predicate “free” in a concert of free ‑jazz given that same day. On Friday we 
rest, in order to assimilate all these heterogeneous aesthetic experiences. This 
is a hyperbolic exemplification of what Gadamer calls the dissolution of taste. 
We can appreciate anything whatsoever, as we are able, each time, to place the 
artwork in the appropriate historical and cultural context.
But for Gadamer this is not at all how artworks should be experienced, 
and this is also not at all how texts, including philosophical, jurisprudential 
and theological texts, should be read. This idea of hermeneutics as form 
of contextual historicism is rooted in the idea (shared also by Chernyak at 
the end of his essay)13 that artworks, according to hermeneutics, are, in the 
last instance, texts to be deciphered, and that the historical information will 
provide us with the passwords to enter into the beautiful world of the artistic 
pantheon. But in fact, as already claimed on other occasions,14 this is not at 
all what Gadamer’s hermeneutics intends to achieve. Gadamer does not want 
to ground aesthetics on hermeneutics, but the other way round. He endorses 
an approach to textual goods which is in some sense grounded in our (real, 
not ideologically biased) experience of artworks, and more specifically of 
artworks of performing arts:
The following investigation starts with a critique of aesthetic consciousness 
in order to defend the experience of truth that comes to us through the work 
of art against the aesthetic theory that lets itself be restricted to a scientific 
conception of truth. But the book does not rest content with justifying the 
truth of art; instead, it tries to develop from this starting point a conception 
of knowledge and of truth that corresponds to the whole of our hermeneutic 
experience. Just as in the experience of art we are concerned with truths that 
go essentially beyond the range of methodical knowledge, so the same thing 
is true of the whole of the human science.15
I don’t want to deny the importance of language in Gadamer’s hermeneu‑
tics. I do believe, however, that in order to adequately evaluate its importance 
13  “The most adequate form for representing culture is, from Gadamer’s point of view, 
a text” (Chernyak 1988, 217).
14 See for example Ruta 2019.
15 Gadamer 2004, XXII.
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we have to take into account the whole hermeneutical project of Truth and 
Method. To put it briefly: for Gadamer, if culture is text, we have to add that 
texts, in order to be accessed, also by simply reading them, are to be performed.16
Once we have said this, we have consequently to answer two questions:
1) What is wrong with the experience of art (and of truth) adopting the 
approach of aesthetic consciousness?
2) What is right about the real experience of artworks of performing arts, 
which can be also applied to any hermeneutical praxis?
The first question will be answered in the last part of this third section, 
while the second question will constitute part of the topics discussed in the 
fifth and final section of the essay.
In order to understand what is wrong in the aesthetic and historical 
consciousness, according to Gadamer, we can again refer to the text by Flo‑
rensky. According to Gadamer, the kind of attitude reinforced by the aesthetic‑
‑historical consciousness, consisting in framing the artwork or the historical 
fact to be understood in its aesthetic or historical framework, implicitly endorses 
an idea of the object to be approached as dead object, as simply a thing: in 
Florensky’s words, as an “immobile, stagnant, dead mummy of artistic produc‑
tion.” The following excerpt about historicism sets out such a characterization 
almost literally:
In historical studies this experience has led to the idea that objective knowl‑
edge can be achieved only if there has been a certain historical distance. It 
is true that what a thing has to say, its intrinsic content, first appears only 
after it is divorced from the fleeting circumstances that gave rise to it. The 
positive conditions of historical understanding include the relative closure of 
a historical event, which allows us to view it as a whole, and its distance from 
contemporary opinions concerning its import. The implicit presupposition of 
historical method, then, is that the permanent significance of something can 
first be known objectively only when it belongs to a closed context – in other 
words, when it is dead enough to have only historical interest. Only then does 
it seem possible to exclude the subjective involvement of the observer.17
16  “Like a public reading or performance, being read belongs to literature by its nature. 
They are stages of what is generally called ‘reproduction’ but which in fact is the 
original mode of being of all performing arts, and that mode of being has proved 
exemplary for defining the mode of being of all art” (Gadamer 2004, 154).
17 Gadamer 2004, 294.
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The last excerpt is important, as it allows us to understand both the meta­
physical sin, which the aesthetic and historical attitudes have in common, as 
well as the label unresolved Cartesianism which Gadamer attaches to Dilthey,18 
and according to which he was not able, in fact, to free himself from the model 
of Naturwissenschaften, even while officially being the philosopher who claimed 
the methodological independence of Geisteswissenschaften. The Cartesianism 
of this operation consists, in brief, in the movement of bringing the object of 
investigation before the consciousness, which gains, through this very movement, 
a non ­engaged and alienated position. The historical consciousness, according 
to Gadamer’s interpretation, contextualizes the historical objects in order to take 
a (scientific) distance from them: it puts them in the right historical frame.: this 
is, metaphorically put, what these two apparently different phenomena have 
in common.
There is more: this alienating movement of putting the object in front of 
oneself in order to know it, this movement of eradicating himself from the reality 
in order to better know and control it, is also, and in fact eminently, characte‑
ristic of the scientific enterprise as research ‑program, which happens to be 
the distinguishing phenomenon of modernity.19 The following excerpt from 
Gadamer shows how the critique of aesthetic consciousness leads finally to 
a critique of modernity, as the age where the only legitimate knowledge is the 
one driven by method:
Just as the age of mechanics felt alienated from nature conceived as the natu‑
ral world and expressed this feeling epistemologically in the concept of self‑
‑consciousness and in the rule, developed into a method, that only “clear and 
18 Gadamer 2004, 231. It remains of course open whether this characterization of 
Cartesianism and its ascription to Dilthey are correct. In fact Truth and Method, by 
providing an encompassing framework of both aesthetics and hermeneutics, has 
to pay the price of such an ambitious project in terms of simplification (or at least 
stylization) of many philosophical questions and answers. But this is a problem 
common to all theoretical enterprises with such scope and ambitions. The same 
considerations are valid for Florensky’s views about modernity, set out in the next 
section. For a criticism of Gadamer’s reading of Dilthey’s hermeneutical project see 
particularly Makkreel 1975, 413–421.
19 This point has been eminently treated by Heidegger in his seminal essay “The Age 
of the World Picture”. See particularly Heidegger 1977, 126–127. In his Lectures on 
Nietzsche, Heidegger pledges also for a notion of modern aesthetics as re ‑proposing 
the Cartesian subject ‑object structure. In this respect, his diagnosis of modern aes‑
thetics is compatible with Gadamer’s one. This does not at all mean that is a good 
diagnosis. For a criticism of it, see Menke 2002, 31–32.
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distinct perceptions” are certain, so also the human sciences of the nineteenth 
century felt a similar alienation from the world of history. The spiritual crea‑
tions of the past, art and history, no longer belong self ‑evidently to the present; 
rather, they are given up to research, they are data or givens (Gegebenheiten) 
from which a past can be made present. Thus the concept of the given is also 
important in Dilthey’s formulation of the concept of Erlebnis.20
As we can see, both aesthetic consciousness and historical conscious‑
ness, according to Gadamer, repeat the Cartesian configuration enforced by 
the Naturwissenschaften. They configure themselves in the form of both an 
alienated subject on the one side, and a reified object on the other. The very 
notion of method is the price paid by modern subjectivity in order to regain 
access to a reality from which it has alienated itself, and in which it no longer 
takes part, in order to better control it. Now the point I intend to make is that 
such a metaphysical configuration is very much in line with the way Pavel 
Florensky characterizes the Weltanschauung implied by the notion of linear 
perspective. This is the subject of the next section.
4. Florensky’s Reverse Perspective as Criticism of Modernity
In this fourth section, I intend to show how the diagnosis of modernity as an 
age of alienation and reification, articulated in Gadamer’s notion of aesthetic 
(and historical) consciousness, is implicitly adopted by Pavel Florensky in the 
analysis of perspective developed in his seminal work “Reverse Perspective.”
The approach and content of Florensky’s essay is very well synthetized 
by Stephen C. Hutchings:
“Inverse Perspective” begins with an account of peculiarities in the re‑
presentational structure of ancient icons. […] Much of the essay is taken up 
with condemning those who would explain such peculiarities by reference 
to the painters’ inability to see “naturally.” […] The fact that these artists 
did not submit entirely to its laws was a matter of choice, not ignorance. 
The choice was conditioned by the fact that medieval culture was of the 
“contemplative ‑creative” rather than the “appropriative ‑mechanical” type. 
Whereas post ‑Renaissance civilization posits the individual subject and the 
20 Gadamer 2004, 56.
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desires peculiar to it as the fulcrum of existence and therefore involves a re‑
treat into subjectivism and self ‑gratification, pre ‑Renaissance man – the true 
realist – understood that “in order to desire, it is necessary first to be a reality 
among other realities.” The corollary of this is the recognition of other centers 
of being outside the human subject, each with its own laws and its own form.21
It is immediately curious that, in spite of its ostensibly focusing on a spe‑
cific technical problem, Florensky’s essay relates to far more general questions, 
such as the supposed subjectivism of modern civilization as opposed to the 
realism of the Middle Ages. Such puzzlement is only reinforced by looking 
at the structure of the essay, where an entire section out of two is dedicated 
to an historical analysis not of reverse perspective, but rather of linear per‑
spective and its metaphysical presuppositions. Why so much space dedicated 
to something which does not directly concern the object of the essay? And 
why start the essay with a long and challenging historical preamble, instead 
of entering directly into the technical questions?
In order to answer these questions, we have to glance over the circum‑
stances of the composition of Florensky’s essay and its relation with his 
essay on church ritual. Despite treating different topics, the two texts share 
the same addressee (both intended as a “lecture for the Commission for the 
Preservation of Monuments and Antiquities of the Lavra of the Trinity and 
St Sergius”22) and the same intent, that of defending the artistic and religious 
patrimony of Lavra against the acts of vandalism which were taking place in 
the era.23 Given this situation, the strategic approach adopted in “Reverse 
Perspective” and as synthetized by Hutchings, becomes understandable: Flo‑
rensky’s priority is not to enter into the aesthetical or iconographical details 
of the technique used in the art of icons, but rather to provide a “theoretical 
system of art ‑historical appreciation,”24 which could be endorsed by the 
commission in order to support the safeguarding of the artistic and religious 
patrimony.
21 Hutchings 1999, 103. Hutching proposes in his article an alternative translation of 
the title of Florensky’s essay.
22 Misler in Florensky 2002, 300.
23 The new Commission instituted in the years immediately following the Revolution 
initially shared the same objective of the representatives of the Orthodox Church, 
like Pavel Florensky. See on this point Misler, in Florensky 2002, 97.
24 Misler 2002, 42.
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All this becomes quite visible in the organization of the argument. Floren‑
sky has to establish the aesthetic value of an artistic artifact, the Russian Ortho‑
dox icon, which exemplifies a technique of representation that transgresses 
the dominant one, namely linear perspective, whose authority is grounded 
on its claim to possess two interrelated properties: naturalism and realism.
Both historians of painting and theoreticians of the visual arts aspire, or at least 
did so until recently, to convince their audience that a perspectival depiction 
of the world is the only correct one, since it is the only one that corresponds to 
actual perception, because natural perception is presumed to be perspectival. 
According to such a premise, deviation from perspectival unity is thereupon 
regarded as a betrayal of the law of perception, a perversion of reality itself, 
whether because the artist lacks training in drawing, or because drawing has 
been consciously subordinated to decorative, ornamental aims or, in the best 
case scenario, compositional aims. Either way, according to this estimation, 
deviation from the norms of perspectival unity appears as unrealism.25
In order to legitimate the aesthetic legitimacy of such transgressions, 
Florensky chooses a clever two ‑stage approach:
1. In the first stage, his aim is to provide a legitimation of the transgres‑
sion of linear perspective as being not a mistake or a fallacy, and so something 
less appropriate than linear perspective, but rather as an alternative way to 
depict reality. In fact, perspective is not a natural way of depicting reality, but 
a conventional one, which has its rights and its limits, relative to its historical 
and cultural context, just like any other convention:
Is perspective, the perspectival image of the world, the perspectival interpreta‑
tion of the world, a natural image that flows from its essence, a true w o r d  o f 
t h e  w o r l d, or is it just a particular orthography, one of many constructions 
that is characteristic of those who created it, relative to the century and the 
life ‑concept of those who invented it, and expressive of t h e i r  own style – but 
by no means excluding other orthographies, other systems of transcriptions, 
corresponding to the life ‑concept and style of other centuries?26
In this first operation we can say that Florensky dismantles a vertical 
arrangement, according to which linear perspective, as a natural and objective 
way of representing, is a better (the best) way of depicting three ‑dimensional 
25 Florensky 2002, 251.
26 Florensky 2002, 207. Underlines are included in the original formatting.
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reality on a two ‑dimensional surface. By delegitimizing the supposed superio‑
rity of linear perspective against other techniques, Florensky thereby puts 
the linear and reverse perspective in a horizontal position, one beside the other, 
as alternative possible ways of depiction. The first argumentative move of 
Florensky is thus a pledge for pluralism.
2. However, almost immediately afterwards Florensky makes a second 
move, consisting in restoring a vertical line, a sort of hierarchy, but inverted. Now 
the question is no longer one of claiming a peer ‑to‑peer relation between linear 
and reverse perspective, but rather the superiority of the second against the 
first in terms of realism. The argument used by Florensky is the following: 
linear perspective in fact is not only unnatural (it is a convention), but also 
unrealistic, as a subjectivist and illusionistic presentation of reality. It presents 
the world it as it would appear to a hypothetical observer: thus in fact, and 
surprisingly, it isn’t a triumph of objectivity but rather of subjectivity.
The absence of linear perspective among the Egyptians, as also in a different 
sense among the Chinese, demonstrates the maturity of their art, and even its 
senile overripeness, rather than its infantile lack of experience. It demonstrates 
the l i b e r a t i o n  from perspective, or a refusal from the very beginning to 
acknowledge its power – a power which, as we will see, is characteristic of 
subjectivism and illusionism – for the sake of religious objectivity and supraper­
sonal metaphysics. Conversely, when the religious stability of a Weltanschauung 
disintegrates and the sacred metaphysics of the g e n e r a l  popular conscious‑
ness is eroded by the individual judgement of a single person with his s i n g l e 
point of view, and moreover with a s i n g l e  point of view precisely at t h i s 
specific moment – then there also appears a perspective, which is characteristic 
of a fragmented consciousness.27
As can be easily detected here, and as will become clearer in what fol‑
lows, Florensky here de facto adopts (as in essence so does Gadamer) an im‑
plicitly Hegelian reading of modernity, characterized by the rise of subjectivity 
which is, in one and the same move, the rise of alienated subjectivity. In Hegel’s 
approach, as was well summarized by Jürgen Habermas, in order to claim 
its own right and freedom this subjectivity has to pay the price of alienat‑
ing itself – alie nating itself from traditions and their unjustified prejudices 
(theoretical subjectivity), from the collectivity and its coercive and unjusti‑
27 Florensky 2002, 208–209
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fied customs (moral subjectivity), and finally from reality itself ( aesthetic 
subjectivity):
The principle of subjectivity determines the forms of modern culture. This holds 
true first of all for objectifying science, which disenchants nature at the same 
time that it liberates the knowing subject: […] The moral concepts of modern 
times follow from the recognition of the subjective freedom of individuals. 
[…] Modern art reveals its essence in Romanticism; and absolute inwardness 
determines the form and content of Romantic art. The divine irony conceptua‑
lized by Friedrich Schlegel mirrors the self ‑experience of a decentered self “for 
which all bonds are broken, and which only will endure to live in the bliss of 
self ‑enjoyment.”28
That Florensky not only superficially adopts, or at least shares, such 
a reading of modernity, can be verified by the fact that the two opposing 
figures in which the alienated modern subjectivity manifests itself – namely 
the theoretical subjectivity which aims at controlling reality by dominating it 
through science and technology, and the aesthetic subjectivity which on the 
contrary escapes reality by programmatically refusing to compromise with it – 
are presented in his essay, in reverse order.
The first claim is that the Weltanschauung entailed in the adoption of linear 
perspective is that of an unengaged viewer, a spectator which has no sense of 
responsibility: this bold claim almost exactly mirrors the critique of romantic 
irony formulated by Hegel:29
Perspective is rooted in the theatre not simply because historically and tech‑
nically perspective was first used in the theatre, but also by virtue of a deeper 
28 Habermas 1987, 17–18.
29 Robert Brandom’s analysis of the end of the first section of The World of Self ­Alienated 
Spirit of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit stresses how the so ‑to‑speak destiny of aliena­
ted subjectivity is nihilism, as announced in the discussion of the ironic conscious‑
ness which, literally repeating Florensky’s words, does not undertake responsibility 
for its own speech: “The practical understanding this disrupted consciousness has 
of its own attitudes is ironic. It still makes distinctions and employs concepts, but 
it does not take its commitments seriously, does not take itself to be undertaking 
responsibilities by its talk. […] Its ironic stance consists in not identifying even 
with its own attitudes, which it knows to be in the end vain and contentless. […] 
Still the adoption of this nihilistic recognitive attitude remains a characteristically 
modern assertion of the authority of the individual – a manifestation of the rise 
of subjectivity, even in a perverse overreaction. It is a ‘self ‑centered self’ [Hegel 
2010, 526], which seeks recognition of itself in its exercise of the power to make 
the norms vain by taking them to be so” (Brandom 2019, 513–514).
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motivation: the theatricality of a perspectival depiction of the world. For in 
this consists that facile experience of the world, devoid of a feeling for reality 
and a sense of responsibility, that sees life as just a spectacle, and in no sense 
a challenge.30
In the lines immediately following, Florensky analyzes the second aspect of 
modern subjectivity, the detachment from reality in the sense of the Kantian 
disinterested aesthetic recipient, which approaches reality according to its 
own categories, structuring its own perspectival and subjective space. This 
second aspect consists in assuming that reality, in itself, is so to speak formless, 
a sort of amorphous material to be formed by the (theoretical and practical) 
work of the subject:
If one sums up every charge that is leveled against mediaeval art on formal 
grounds, it amounts to the criticism: “There’s no understanding of space,” and 
this criticism, if openly expressed, signifies that there is no spatial unity, no 
Euclidean ‑Kantian schema of space […] On this basis it is suggested (and what’s 
most dangerous is suggested unconsciously) as quite self ‑evident or absolutely 
proven somewhere or by someone, that no forms exist in nature, in the sense 
of each form living in its own little world, for in general no reality exists that 
has a centre within itself and is therefore subject to its own laws. Therefore, 
it is suggested, everything visible and perceptible is only simple material for 
filling in some general regulatory schema imposed on it from without, a func‑
tion fulfilled by Euclidean ‑Kantian space. Consequently, all forms in nature 
are essentially only apparent forms, imposed on an impersonal and indifferent 
material by a schema of scientific thought.31
In his analysis, Florensky shows how this second, theoretical, side of 
the modern Kantian subjectivity has a destiny symmetrical to the first, the 
aesthetic ‑ironic one (see n. 29), namely a commitment to what nowadays is 
named nihilism, the negation of all reality. Theoretical (and in fact practical) 
nihilism consists in the negation of reality by its “predatory attitude” towards 
it: the modern subjectivity does not accept reality, but rather submits it to its 
own laws. This attitude, finally, is emphatically opposed to the medieval one, 
where reality is recognized and accepted:
The pathos of modern man is to shake off all realities, so that ‘I want’ estab‑
lishes the law of a newly constructed reality, phantasmagoric even though it 
30 Florensky 2002, 211.
31 Florensky 2002, 216
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is enclosed within ruled ‑out squares. Conversely, the pathos of ancient man, 
and of mediaeval man too, is the acceptance, the grateful acknowledgment, 
and the affirmation of all kinds of reality as a blessing, for being is blessing, 
and blessing is being. The pathos of medieval man is an affirmation of reality 
both in himself and outside himself, and is therefore objectivity. […] in the 
final analysis there are only two experiences of the world – a human expe‑
rience in a large sense and a scientific, i.e., ‘Kantian’ experience, just as there 
are only two attitudes towards life – the internal and the external, and as there 
are two types of culture – one contemplative and creative, the other predatory 
and mechanical.32
Before concluding this section and passing to the next, let me make two 
(in my view) important points:
1. This explicit opposition between the pre ‑modern and modern Weltan­
schauung has, de facto, both a strategic and tactical function. It is by this 
very characterization of modernity as predatory, as reifying activity, that the 
traditional point of view upheld by Florensky can find a counterpart in the 
(supposed ly) progressive attitude of the newly instituted Commission. It is suf‑
ficient to read some passages of György Lukács’ History and Class Consciousness, 
written in 1920, to realize how Florensky’s reading of modernity is compatible 
with a (orthodox) Marxist ‑inspired one.33 Of course, I don’t presume that Flo‑
rensky developed his theory simply in order to please the Commission. But it 
is a fact that such a view, which Florensky evidently developed out of an inde‑
pendent interest, plays an important tactical role in the economy of the essay.
2. The second point to be made is that the centrality given to Kant in 
this reading of modernity determines both a point of contact and of distance 
with Gadamer’s approach: Florensky, like Gadamer, sees Kant as one of the 
main culprits of the situation that characterizes modern consciousness. But 
while Florensky sees in Kant the theoretical point of arrival of a characterization 
of consciousness as one alienated from the world, which has to dominate it 
in order to access it,34 Gadamer sees in Kant rather an aesthetic point of de­
parture, according to which art has nothing to do with truth, and therefore 
should be enjoyed in a reflexive, disinterested way, in order to guarantee 
32 Florensky 2002, 217–218. 
33 See particularly Lukács 1971, 111–112. 
34 This characterization of Kant’s philosophy as opposed to reality is present in Flo‑
rensky as early as his dissertation, as well shown by Frank Haney (see particularly 
Haney 2001, 94).
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the  universality of aesthetic judgement, which cannot refer to anything ob‑
jective, but only to a subjective (but not individually determined) free play 
of faculties, purely contemplative.
Beyond simply critiquing modernity, however, it is their aim to provide 
an aesthetic alternative where Florensky and Gadamer again formulate posi‑
tions about art and truth which, without being simply coincident, seem to 
look in the same direction. As we will see, both authors in this case adopt 
a position which is incompatible with the Hegelian one (or at least with one 
of the several Hegelian positions that could be formulated). Here I refer spe‑
cifically to excerpts from the Lectures on Aesthetics where the passage of art, 
which “sets truth before our minds in the mode of sensuous configuration,”35 
into more abstract and therefore more accomplished forms of truth ‑setting, 
and most eminently in philosophy, is theorized together with the consequent 
Vergangenheitscharakter der Kunst:36 
There is a deeper comprehension of truth which is no longer so akin and 
friendly to sense as to be capable of appropriate adoption and expression in this 
medium. […] Thought and reflection have spread their wings above fine art. 
[…] The development of reflection in our life today has made it a need of ours, 
in relation both to our will and judgement, to cling to general considerations 
and to regulate the particular by them […] Consequently the conditions of our 
present time are not favourable to art. […] In all these respects art, considered 
in its highest vocation, is and remains for us a thing of the past.37
Unlike Hegel, Gadamer and Florensky both think that art still has something 
important to say about “setting the truth.” Theirs is, however, not simply the 
reactionary position of re ‑sensualizing the truth; nor is it even a progressive 
position about such a re ‑sensualization, which might to draw valuable support 
from observations concerning the rise of the new forms of media which have 
re ‑shaped our domain of perception, and in which the truth can find a new 
sensuous configuration.38 According to the Hegelian scheme, such a position 
35 Hegel 1975, I, 101.
36 See on this formula particularly Gethmann ‑Siefert 2005, 347–360.
37 Hegel 1975, I, 10–11. 
38 Without referring to the countless studies on the subject, the classical analysis by 
Walter Benjamin about cinema and its medial revolutionary impact on art can in 
this respect be taken as a falsification of Hegel’s diagnosis of romantic art, accord‑
ing to which “every form and every material is now at the service and command 
of the artist whose talent and genius is explicitly freed from the earlier limitation 
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would be only a repetition of the previous process: once the new forms of 
media are fully aesthetically exploited, then the need for abstractness would 
again require the passage from art into philosophy.
Both Florensky and Gadamer think rather that art has primarily to do 
with truth in a way which cannot be substituted by philosophy (unless this itself 
adopts some key characteristics of art experience), and even less by scientific 
knowledge as it has shaped itself in the modern age. If art has something to say 
about truth, is something revolutionary, not reactionary, since it has to do with 
the performative aspect of art experience. In this respect, both thinkers implicitly 
assume that art is not only a thing of the past, but contains also a significant 
potential for our future ways of dealing with truth. In order to rightly evaluate 
the contribution of art in “setting the truth,” we have, however, to reshape our 
notion of truth as modeled on the subject ‑object configuration, which according 
to both authors characterizes modernity. Truth cannot consist in the Kant’s 
inverted (Copernican) version of the notion of adaequatio rei et intellectus, ex‑
plicitly adopted in the first Critique, according to which the material of reality 
is submitted to the forms of subject. The truth is not the result of adequacy, but 
rather of an active interaction between subject and object, in which the exposure 
of the subject to the reality is not conceived primarily in terms of perception 
(as already Kant grants), but rather in terms of participation. If art can still say 
something, and something important, about truth, it is because knowledge has 
to be reconfigured according to the performative space envisaged by Scriabin 
in the passage quoted at the end of the second section: a space in which, in 
Russell’s terms,39 we can get acquainted with something only by taking part in it.
5. Art, Truth and Performative Space: Intersections of Past and Future 
in Gadamer’s and Florensky’s Aesthetic Theories
Having analyzed the critique of modernity implicit in Florensky’s and Gada‑
mer’s texts, as it were the pars destruens of their aesthetic theories, I do not 
intend in this section to provide an account of the pars construens of the art 
to one specific art ‑form” (Hegel 1975, I, 606). See in this respect Benjamin 1969, 
particularly Sections VII–XIII.
39 See Russell 1999, Chapter 5.
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theories of both thinkers (assuming that they have one), in order thereafter 
to see whether they share some common points. The objective is much more 
modest: I intend to identify some elements that both authors propose as alter‑
native to the notion of art and aesthetics developed in the modern times, which 
they claim to be inadequate. Again, the aim is not to detect a similarity or 
identity of theses, but rather to identify common lines of questioning along 
which both authors travel, according to exigencies which, in my view, point 
in the same direction.
I have identified three items. Two were anticipated at the end of section 
four, referring respectively to the question of the truth ­value of art and to its 
performative dimension. They will take respectively the first and third positions 
in this short list. In the second place, I will mention a further element that 
refers to the question of plurality. These three elements do not have the same 
weight. The first two items, despite occupying spaces of their own, play an 
almost introductory role for the third, which has to be considered the most 
important, and indeed almost the central topic of this last section.
In tackling the first item I start with Gadamer, and specifically with the 
claim I made in the last section according to which in Kant he identified a sort 
of point of departure of the subjectivization of aesthetics, which he heavily 
criticized throughout the whole first section of Truth and Method, and which 
is exemplified most clearly in the notion of aesthetic consciousness. In this 
respect, Kant is guilty of having declared the epistemological irrelevance of art, 
since aesthetic judgment does not concern the Erscheinungen, and even less the 
Ding an sich, but rather our cognitive reactions to them. Through the aesthetic 
judgement we gain no knowledge about the world, but only about ourselves. 
This is the main target of Gadamer’s criticism:
The binding quality of the experience (Erfahrung) of art must not be disinte‑
grated by aesthetic consciousness. This negative insight, positively expressed, 
is that art is knowledge and experiencing an artwork means sharing in that 
knowledge. This raises the question of how one can do justice to the truth of 
aesthetic experience (Erfahrung) and overcome the radical subjectivization of 
the aesthetic that began with Kant’s Critique of Aesthetic Judgment. […] Is 
there to be no knowledge in art? Does not the experience of art contain a claim 
to truth which is certainly different from that of science, but just as certainly 
is not inferior to it?40
40 Gadamer 2004, 84.
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The example which Gadamer choses in order to show, against Kant, that 
Art can (and should always have) a truth value, is the Greek tragedy. For the 
sake of synthesis, I extrapolate three main points from this section of Truth 
and Method which are particularly significant for my argument:
1. The aesthetic experience of Greek tragedy is characterized by Gadamer 
with the strong term communion (Kommunion). This is not, however, to be 
understood as a sort of compassion for the tragic destiny of the characters on 
the stage. Things are much more interesting than that. The notion of com‑
munion is to be understood in the sense that what is experienced is something 
common to everyone – not only the spectator, but ideally also the actors and 
the author. It is a common truth. And, according to Gadamer, this is valid also 
in modern art, including fiction literature: “The writer’s free invention is the 
presentation of a common truth that is binding on the writer also.”41
2. The common truth presented in the work of art, and eminently in the 
Greek tragedy, is not the truth of an event. The realism does not lie in the 
presentation of true facts. The truth presented in the work of art is rather 
a metaphysical one: “Tragic pensiveness does not affirm the tragic course of 
events as such, or the justice of the fate that overtakes the hero but rather 
a metaphysical order of being that is true for all.”42 Art is not simple reproduc‑
tion of reality, but rather presentation of the metaphysical structures which 
inform reality. In this respect, again, fiction can be more “realist” than a news‑
paper article, as it gives us a glimpse into the structure of reality, beyond its 
variables and the contingent elements which characterize the single events. 
Art describes reality by stylizing and typifying it.
3. The second element claims a specific theory of mimesis, which is not 
simply restored by Gadamer, but rather reformulated in order to exhibit its 
epistemological value. This operation consists in two main steps: (a) mimes‑
is is not to be considered as simple repetition, or as imitation of reality: as 
Gada mer says, “mimesis has a cognitive import”, always, and including 
(indeed, possibly eminently) when exercised by children; when we (and 
not only the artist) imitate something, we come to know it better; and on 
the other side, we can imitate something if we, somehow, understood it in 
a certain way; (b) this cognitive import of mimesis is identified in the notion 
41 Gadamer 2004, 129.
42 Gadamer 2004, 128.
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of recognition, which makes the connection with the previously mentioned 
notion of “meta physical order” clear: 
The joy of recognition is […] the joy of knowing more than is already familiar. 
In recognition what we know emerges, as if illuminated, from all the contingent 
and variable circumstances that condition it; it is grasped in its essence. […] 
The ‘known’ enters into its true being and manifests itself as what it is only 
when it is recognized. As recognized, it is grasped in its essence, detached from 
its accidental aspects.43
Both the idea that art has an epistemological import, and that its signi‑
ficance should not be reduced to a subjective or intersubjective reaction to 
(material or formal) stimuli, are to be considered central issues in Florensky’s 
article on reverse perspective. The last lines of the passage quoted in Note 27 
are significant in two respects:
1. Florensky opposes an art of illusion (exemplified by the adoption of 
linear perspective) to the demand for objectivity which he asserts should ani‑
mate genuine art. That this bears upon the notion of truth is explicitly stated 
in the lines immediately following the quoted passage, where it is stressed 
how, and not by chance, linear perspective originated (according to Vitruvius’ 
De Architectura) in decorative art: “when Aeschylus staged his tragedies in 
Athens around 470 BC, and the famous Agatharcos provided him with sets 
and wrote a treatise about them, the Commentarius, it was this that prompted 
Anaxagoras and Democritus to explain the same subject – the painting of stage 
sets – scientifically.”44 So the technique of linear perspective was devised origi‑
nally “not in pure art, which is essentially always more or less metaphysical, 
but in applied art, as an element of decoration, which has as its task not the 
true essence of being, but verisimilitude to appearance.”45 
2. In the excerpt quoted it is not only stated that genuine art has to do 
with truth and not with appearance, but also that, in order to accomplish 
43 Gadamer 2004, 113–114. Adorno’s statement, according to which the musical inter‑
pretative act, even in the case of pure instrumental music (so an interpretation of an 
artwork which paradigmatically neither denotes nor exemplifies images or mean‑
ings, to be eventually imitated) entails a mimetic dimension, can be considered as 
the symmetrical position to Gadamer’s, according to which any mimetic act entails 
a hermeneutical dimension. See for example Adorno 2006, 169–170.
44 Florensky 2002, 209. Also in this case, the question is not whether such reconstruc‑
tion is correct, or fully correct. This has no role in my argument.
45 Florensky 2002, 209.
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such a task, it has to tackle with essence of reality. It is therefore implicit‑
ly assumed that the (traditionally understood) notion of mimesis as simple 
imitation, as duplication of reality, is not what genuine art should do. This 
point is confirmed, among others, in another passage: “The task of painting 
is not to duplicate reality, but to give the most profound penetration of its 
architectonics, of its material, of its meaning.”46 It is clear that Florensky, 
unlike Gadamer, does not here provide a theory of mimesis which would 
satisfy the demands of genuine art: and this is possibly also due to the fact 
that Florensky’s main Greek reference is not Aristotle, as in Gadamer’s case, 
but rather Plato, whom he considered virtually as an objective counterpoint to 
Kant’s subjectivism in the Western tradition,47 and who notably formulated, 
in the 10th Book of the Republic, one of the most radical criticisms of art as 
mimetic activity. As para doxical it may sound, however, it remains that art, 
in order to be realist, has to deal (in Gadamer’s words) with the metaphysical 
order of reality.
In assigning such a task to genuine art, and in criticizing the subjectiv‑
ism of linear perspective, Florensky develops a further argument that con‑
stitutes my second item of comparison between Florensky and Gadamer. This 
argument is in fact formulated in three (points two to four) of the six points 
in which Florensky articulates the main features of linear perspective. The 
Kantian ­subjectivist sin of linear perspective, in Florensky’s eyes, is actually 
a triune error: linear perspective is subjective because it is individual (that is, 
it depicts reality from a single point of view), monocular (that is, this point 
of view is constructed as if constituted by a single eye), and immobile (as no 
ocular movement is, so to speak, registered in the painting). Rather than being 
realistic, linear perspective, in a sort of repetition of Plato’s criticism of poets, 
provides a copy of a copy, specifically an imitation of photography: 
The above ‑mentioned lawgiver is thought of as forever inseparably chained to 
his throne. If he quits this absolutized place or even stirs slightly on it, then the 
whole unity of the perspectival construction is immediately shattered and the 
46 Florensky 2002, 209.
47  “In his philosophy of cult, Florensky compares Kant and Plato in one direct oppo‑
sition as intellectual antipodes. In a tabular overview he tries to prove that Kant’s 
philosophy, in its inner structure, corresponds point to point with Plato’s, while 
contentwise he always asserts the opposite of the respective Plato’s statement” 
(Haney 2001, 92).
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whole perspectival system falls apart. In other words, in this conception the 
viewing eye is not the organ of a living creature, who lives and labours in the 
world, but the glass lens of the camera obscura.48
What Florensky proposes in order to overcome such a deplorable situa‑
tion, and as is already exemplified by the Russian icons, is not to eliminate the 
point of view, but rather to pluralize it. Realism is here de facto put into close 
connection with pluralism:
The closest dissemination of the methods of reverse perspective to be noted is 
the use of polycentredness in representations: the composition is constructed as 
if the eye were looking at different parts of it, while changing its position. So, 
for example, some parts of buildings are drawn more or less in line with the 
demands of ordinary linear perspective, but each one from its own particular 
point of view, with its own particular perspectival centre; and sometimes also 
with its own particular horizon, while the other parts are, in addition, shown 
using reverse perspective.49
This passage provides further clarification of the critique of linear per‑
spective. The question of having a point of view is not, per se, problematic. 
Florensky, as far as I understand him, does think of the artist as a human 
being and so as a finite creature, not as a god which has direct access to the 
metaphysical truth. It is rather the contrary which should be maintained. The 
point of view of the artist painting with linear perspective is in fact tacitly 
assumed to be the point of view of God, as it is not declared and put in relation 
with other, finite, points of view (as in the polycentric reverse perspective); 
it is therefore absolutized. So, Florensky concludes, the position of the artist 
is declared to be the centre of the world; it claims to reflect spatially the Kantian 
absolute, gnoseological significance of the artist. Truly, he looks at life ‘from 
a point of view’, but without any further definition, for this point, elevated 
into an absolute, is definitely no different from all the other points of space, 
and its elevation over the rest is not only unjustified, it is unjustifiable, given 
the entire world view under discussion.50
The question of pluralism in our understanding is central to Gadamer’s 
hermeneutical project. The classic excerpt which addresses it is the following:
48 Florensky 2002, 263–264
49 Florensky 2002, 204.
50 Florensky 2002, 262.
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Every age has to understand a transmitted text in its own way, for the text be‑
longs to the whole tradition whose content interests the age and in which it seeks 
to understand itself. The real meaning of a text, as it speaks to the interpreter, 
does not depend on the contingencies of the author and his original audience. 
It certainly is not identical with them, for it is always co ‑determined also by the 
historical situation of the interpreter and hence by the totality of the objective 
course of history. […]. Not just occasionally but always, the meaning of a text 
goes beyond its author. That is why understanding is not merely a reproductive 
but always a productive activity as well. Perhaps it is not correct to refer to 
this productive element in understanding as “better understanding.” […] It is 
enough to say that we understand in a different way, if we understand at all.51
An obvious objection which could be made in this context is that, in 
fact, the pluralism advocated by Gadamer is a hermeneutical, interpretive one, 
while the one advocated by Florensky is an artistic, productive one. Yet in fact 
such objection would miss the real point at stake here (and this is why the 
task of this essay does not consist in simply individuating some affinities, 
since in some cases these can be deceiving). Gadamer’s considerations related 
to understanding in fact indirectly concern the artistic production as well. 
This can be easily verified if we again refer to the very notion of mimesis, as 
described above, which is the base of the artistic act. In Gadamer’s eyes, as 
we have shown, mimesis is never simple reproduction, and therefore cannot 
be perfectly accomplished. In a certain sense, there is no perfect mimesis, but 
only more or less felicitous mimesis. There is not a sort of model which can 
be perfectly reproduced. As Gadamer points out, 
In imitating, one has to leave out and to heighten. Because he is pointing to 
something, he has to exaggerate, whether he likes it or not […]. Hence there 
exists an insuperable ontological difference between the one thing that is 
a likeness and the other that it seeks to resemble.52
If mimesis, as such, not only has an epistemological import (concerning 
truth and knowledge) but also a hermeneutical import (concerning understand‑
ing), it is reasonable to assume that the question of pluralism is also relevant to 
51 Gadamer 2004, 296. 
52 Gadamer 2004, 114. It is very instructive to notice that, in a specific musical context, 
Hermann Danuser says substantially the same thing in relation to musical inter‑
pretation, which cannot, per definition, actualize all the structures exemplified by 
the musical score. See Danuser 1994, 1055–1056.
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it. The pointing to some aspects of the imitated object constitutes, so to speak, 
the hermeneutical act which is at the base of mimesis, and which enables it. 
This aspect is evident, for example, in the performances of caricaturists, who 
imitate on the stage particular individuals by exaggerating some aspects of 
them, thereby casting a sort of theoretical light on their whole personality, 
which is thereby typified and assumes a sort of universal character. Finally, 
there is a hermeneutical act which is performed both in the creation of the 
artwork and in the interpretations of them, a hermeneutical act which, as such, 
can never be considered perfectly accomplished. Pluralism thus concerns art 
in all its aspects.
My intention here is not to deny the difference between the composition 
of a theater piece, its performance, and the critique made of it by an art crit‑
ic. I want on the contrary to stress that, in Gadamer’s approach, besides the 
many aspects which differentiate these three acts, there is also something 
which they have in common, and that this common element is the mimetic 
(and therefore hermeneutical) act, which, as specified in the previous passage, 
brings with it a sort of unilaterality, and therefore calls for a pluralism. Given 
these specifications, the following passage from Gadamer, and the provocative 
formula of double mimesis, becomes easier to understand:
What the actor plays and the spectator recognizes are the forms and the action 
itself, as they are formed by the poet. Thus we have here a double mimesis: the 
writer represents and the actor represents. But even this double mimesis is one: 
it is the same thing that comes to existence in each case. More exactly, one can 
say that the mimetic representation (Darstellung), the performance, brings into 
existence (zum Dasein) what the play itself requires. […] It is to move out of 
the real experience of the play if the spectator reflects about the conception 
behind a performance or about the proficiency of the actors.53
The last aspect I intend to take into consideration, as anticipated at the 
outset, is the notion of performative space, which, despite not having been 
explicitly formulated in these terms by either thinker, I consider to be the 
central element in a proper understanding of the aesthetic proposals of both 
Gadamer and Florensky, as the space in which a genuine relation between 
subject and object can be thought and realized, and which is alternative to 
the one formulated and put in place in the modernity.
53 Gadamer 2004, 116. 
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I take this notion by Erika Fischer ‑Lichte, who uses it to characterize the 
space in which a performance takes place, as a specific space to be distin‑
guished from our normal, geometrical notion of space:
First, the space in which a performance takes place represents an architectural‑
‑geometric space that pre ‑dates the performance and endures after it has ended. 
[…] In contrast, the space in which a performance occurs can be regarded as 
a performative space. It opens special possibilities for the relationship between 
actors and spectators and for movement and perception. Whatever the ways in 
which these possibilities are used, applied, realized, treated, or, alternatively, 
subverted, they affect the performative space. Every movement of people, 
objects, lights, and every noise can transform this unstable and fluctuating 
space. The performance’s spatiality is brought forth by the performative space 
and must be examined within the parameters set by it.54
In the chapter dedicated to it, Fischer ‑Lichte clarifies how the performa‑
tive space can assume different configurations in which spectators and actors 
interact in quite different ways. On the other side, Fischer ‑Lichte’s analysis 
raises the following questions: What specificity does the performative space 
acquire by being a space where performances are performed? And what are 
the theoretical implications of such a factual difference?
The thesis that I endorse here is the following: the specific nature of 
a performative space, independently from the different configurations it can 
acquire, consists in the fact that, in that space, one can get acquainted with 
something only by taking part in it. It is in this specific sense that in the per‑
formative space there are no pure theoretical, epistemologically disinterested 
behaviors. This is because, in such spaces, knowledge cannot be attained 
without active participation. Even the spectator, sitting in the parquet of the 
most traditional theater, can get acquainted with the performance, can know 
it, only by participating in that event. Thus we say, when someone claims that 
something magical transpired in a concert at which he was present: “I know 
what you mean. I was there too”. This constitutes the break with the Carte‑
sian constitution of subject ‑object, where the object sits in front of the subject 
as an empty box in which things are there to be perceived and known. The 
acquaintance with a performance in a performative space does not consist 
in a simple cognitive or perceptual operation, where some “information” is 
54 Fischer ‑Lichte 2008, 107.
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received by a subject which somehow internalizes and elaborates it, in order 
to extract some knowledge from it. Participation is not mere elaboration of 
information.
The theoretical import of this specificity can be underscored by referring 
to Gadamer’s considerations about drama as an event to be celebrated:
A festival exists only in being celebrated. […] The same is true of drama: it must 
be presented for the spectator, and yet its being is by no means just the point 
of intersection of the spectators’ experiences. Rather, the contrary is true: the 
being of the spectator is determined by his “being there present” (Dabeisein). 
[…] To be present means to participate. If someone was present at something, 
he knows all about how it really was. […] Thus watching something is a genu‑
ine mode of participating. Here we can recall the concept of sacral communion 
that lies behind the original Greek concept of theoria. Theoros means someone 
who takes part in a delegation to a festival. Such a person has no other distinc‑
tion or function than to be there. Thus the theoros is a spectator in the proper 
sense of the word, since he participates in the solemn act through his presence 
at it and thus sacred law accords him a distinction: for example, inviolability. 
In the same way, Greek metaphysics still conceives the essence of theoria and 
of nous as being purely present to what is truly real, and for us too the ability 
to act theoretically is defined by the fact that in attending to something one is 
able to forget one’s own purposes. But theoria is not to be conceived primarily 
as subjective conduct, as a self ‑determination of the subject, but in terms of 
what it is contemplating. Theoria is a true participation, not something active 
but something passive (pathos), namely being totally involved in and carried 
away by what one sees.55
We have to be careful here, as words can be misleading: while in the 
Kantian configuration, even as (more or less legitimately – but this is not the 
point) understood by Florensky as an eminent expression of the Cartesian meta‑
physical configuration of modernity, passivity plays a strategic role in order to 
avoid metaphysical dogmatism, such a passivity is not at all to be understood 
as in the previous passage from Gadamer. The passivity at work in the First 
Critique, as characteristic of one of the two sources of knowledge, is much 
more compatible with a kind of knowledge based on cognitive psychology, 
and modeled on information systems, according to which knowledge is the 
product of a working ‑out of the material provided by the reality. Passivity, in 
55 Gadamer 2004, 121–122.
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this respect, would be considered as almost synonymous with a “registering” 
of raw data in order to transform it into knowledge. But this is not what is 
meant by Gadamer. The passivity at work in the previous passage, in Kantian 
terms, means that even the categories are so to speak exposed, and indeed the 
whole subject is exposed in the notion of “sacral communion that lies behind 
the original Greek concept of theoria.” This is very well expressed in the fol‑
lowing excerpt, where the notion of “being present” is understood as “being 
outside oneself.” This is a radical exposition, not one limited to the registration 
of “data” provided by reality (while the categories remain protected in the 
locked realm of subjectivity):
We started by saying that the true being of the spectator, who belongs to 
the play of art, cannot be adequately understood in terms of subjectivity, as 
a way that aesthetic consciousness conducts itself. But this does not mean that 
the nature of the spectator cannot be described in terms of being present at 
something, in the way that we pointed out. Considered as a subjective accom‑
plishment in human conduct, being present has the character of being outside 
oneself. […]. In fact, being outside oneself is the positive possibility of being 
wholly with something else. This kind of being present is a self ‑forgetfulness, 
and to be a spectator consists in giving oneself in self ‑forgetfulness to what 
one is watching. Here self ‑forgetfulness is anything but a privative condition, 
for it arises from devoting one’s full attention to the matter at hand, and this 
is the spectator’s own positive accomplishment.56
In what does the performative character of all this consist? We saw that 
taking part in something is akin to being outside oneself. But what makes the 
link between such a configuration and the typical aspects of artistic experience 
which are labeled under the notion of performativity? My answer consists 
in the following: only through this notion of taking part, of being outside 
oneself, can one understand what Erika Fisher Lichte calls the transformative 
character of performance. And this constitutes the point of contact of the whole 
constellation of performativity with the notion of Hegelian experience, which 
is a central notion of Gadamer’s hermeneutics. Experience, in the Hegelian 
sense, is not a simple transformation of raw data, but a transformation of oneself; 
after a real experience, we are no longer the same individuals. And the expe‑
rience of art is in this respect paradigmatic, only if it has the characteristics 
56 Gadamer 2004, 122. 
MARCELLO RUTA124
described before by Gadamer, and only if the subjectivity, in some Hegelian 
sense, alienates itself in the situation instead of alienating itself from it, as the 
modern Cartesian configuration seems to suggest.
The notion of taking part in something as being outside oneself appears 
in several considerations offered by Florensky, and not only in relation to the 
phenomenon of cult. Of course in his study on cult he states that “The real 
way to approach the sacraments is to participate in them,”57 but this is not 
the real point. In my view, such a vision of getting acquainted with something 
by participating in it, although eminently exemplified by the cult, actually 
informs the whole of Florensky’s aesthetics, and is the counterpart of his 
criticism of modernity. This can be seen in two different excerpts, from two 
different works, where the same expression living contact is used:
1. In his paper “On realism” he clearly states that aesthetic realism can 
only be achieved on the basis of a realistic Weltanschauung, consisting precisely 
in an idea of a subject which is not looking at reality from an exterior point 
of view (just as, in our pre ‑theoretical idea of realism, we often presuppose 
that in order to avoid subjectivism we must avoid ‘getting involved’), but is 
rather a subject which comes into living contact with reality:
Realism in art has as its necessary prerequisite the realism of an entire world‑
‑understanding. But to go further, can we express a worldwide reality, if we 
ourselves stand outside it and do not come into contact with it? Obviously 
our living remoteness from reality must again destroy realism in art as well. 
There are realities in the world; one comes to know them by coming into living 
contact with them through work in the worldwide sphere. This cognition may 
be expressed by means of art; works of art can unite us with realities that are 
inaccessible to our senses – such are the formal prerequisites of any artistic 
realism, and a tendency that rejects even one of them thereby forfeits its right 
to be called realism.58
2. Such an approach is re ‑stated in his essay on reverse perspective, 
where it is explicitly opposed to that informing linear perspective, which is 
declared to be deceptive:
The task of painting is not to duplicate reality, but to give the most profound 
penetration of its architectonics, of its material, of its meaning. And the pene‑
57 Florensky 2016, 204.
58 Florensky 2002, 180–181.
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tration of this meaning, of this stuff of reality, its architectonics, is offered to the 
artist’s contemplative eye in living contact with reality, by growing accustomed 
to and empathising with reality, whereas theatre decoration wants as much 
as possible to replace reality with its outward appearance. The aesthetics of 
this outward appearance lie in the inner connectedness of its elements, but in 
no way is it the symbolic signifying of the prototype via the image, realised 
by means of artistic technique. Stage design is a deception, albeit a seductive 
one; while pure painting is, or at least wants to be, above all true to life, not 
a substitute for life but merely the symbolic signifier of its deepest reality.
We are now in a position to reconsider the theoretical import – beyond 
its purely practical/rhetorical function in that particular context – of the 
reference to Scriabin’s Prefatory Act quoted at the end of the first Section: 
the performative space envisaged by Scriabin is, in Florensky’s eyes, de facto 
epistemologically paradigmatic, beyond the specific theological question of 
the cult. It is only in such a space that the word “realism” can acquire an 
adequate exemplification. For Florensky, as for Gadamer, acquaintance is not 
simple registration of data, but participation and, consequently, involvement. The 
active interaction with the environment is not seen as an obstacle to realism, 
as interfering with the objective view of reality, but rather as its necessary 
condition.
It is worth noticing how the ideas of both Florensky and Gadamer, despite 
referring to the history of art (that is, Greek Tragedy and medieval art), come 
to conclusions which are shared nowadays by the many aesthetic approaches 
which are premised on what is called the performative turn. For its part, the 
performative turn has developed its own aesthetics, in many respects opposed 
to modern (and more specifically Kantian) aesthetics, by reflecting both on 
contemporary theatrical performances and on the pre ‑modern notion of cult. 
This is not to claim, though, that in order to find a way out of modernity, we 
have either to look before or after it. What is at issue here is rather to show 
how human history, including the history of art and history of aesthetics, must 
retain an essential element of reflection if it is properly to be called human. 
Human history is a process powered (amongst others) by the act of reflecting, 
including reflecting on its past. In this respect, and beyond the criticism which 
might be levelled at their diagnoses, both Gadamer and Florensky can be said 
to have generously contributed to this process, by providing us with valuable 
tools with which to orient ourselves.
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From Reverse Perspective to Performative Space: 
Gadamerian Reflections on Florensky’s Aesthetics
In this paper I attempt a parallel reading of certain texts by Pavel Florensky and 
Hans ‑Georg Gadamer, particularly, although not exclusively, Florensky’s seminal 
essay “Reverse Perspective”, and Gadamer’s main work Truth and Method. I do not 
thereby seek to establish a problematic historical ‑philosophical connection between 
the two thinkers. I rather analyze some notions and considerations developed by 
both of them in order to allow the emergence of some common views, or at least of 
common orientations, in relation to two overarching aesthetic topics: on the one side, 
what can preliminarily be labelled a critique of modern aesthetics, and on the other 
an idea of the aesthetic experience as taking place in what I will call a performative 
space. While, in relation to the first point, both authors seem to adopt a Hegelian 
reading of modernity, characterized on the one side by an alienated subjectivity, 
on the other side by the reduction of the world to a collection of dead objects, the 
second point indicates a possible alternative to this lamentable situation, consisting 
in the conception of a (performative, space, where acquaintance with objects can only 
be achieved via participation in events. In this respect, while both authors developed 
their views in the course of reflection on cultural and artistic phenomena of the past 
(medieval visual arts and Greek tragedy respectively), they come to results which 
have been reached autonomously by those aesthetic approaches that are premised 
on the so ‑called performative turn.
Key ‑words: philosophy, Hans ‑Georg Gadamer, Pavel Florensky, connection, sub‑
jectivity.
Słowa kluczowe: filozofia, Hans ‑Georg Gadamer, Paweł Florenski, podmiotowość, 
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